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Fair housing and safe housing are not often thought of as 
competing goals, but they can be in terms of the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA) and municipal housing codes.  Conflict can arise where 
cities enforce their housing codes against properties that house 
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lower-income tenants.  Such tenants, in many communities, tend to 
be racial minorities that are protected classes under the FHA.  
Housing code enforcement can make property management more 
expensive, which can result in higher rents that may price out these 
tenants.   
On one hand, cities argue that housing codes must be strictly 
enforced to ensure the safety of residents.1  But on the other hand, 
landlords and tenants argue that to further fair housing, code 
enforcement must not inadvertently discriminate against low-
income properties that are often home to protected classes.2 
 Absent any intentional discrimination in housing code 
enforcement, the key to any fair housing suit in the context of this 
article is disparate impact, which finds discrimination where a 
policy has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class.3 
 The doctrine of disparate impact is in an unsettled state 
because the FHA statute does not expressly mention it,4 even 
though every federal circuit recognizes it.5  But the circuits are split 
 
 1. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993, 999 (D. Minn. 
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that even the plaintiffs did not dispute that “enforcement of the 
housing code is necessary to achieving [the] objectives” of the City to “keep[] the 
City clean, and housing habitable, and mak[e] . . . [its] neighborhoods the safest 
and most livable of any in Minnesota.”); see also Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 5, 
Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011)(No. 10-1032), available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Petitioners-Reply-
10-1032-Magner.pdf (including the City of St. Paul’s argument that landlords 
should not be allowed to use the FHA to avoid compliance with housing codes and 
“rent dilapidated and unsafe housing to minorities”). 
 2. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 995, 997 (noting that the plaintiffs claimed 
that “enforcement of the housing code, which is stricter than the . . . [federal 
Housing Quality Standards], has a disparate impact on African-Americans because 
compliance with the housing code increases the costs of low-income housing and 
African-Americans make up a disproportionate percentage of low-income 
tenants”). 
 3. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:6 
(2011), available at WL, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation § 10:6 (“The 
key questions in [a disparate impact] case will then be whether the impact of the 
defendant’s policy or practice is significantly greater on a class of persons 
protected by the Fair Housing Act than it is on nonprotected class members, and if 
so, whether the defendant has provided a sufficiently strong justification for using 
this policy or practice to overcome the prima facie case that the plaintiff’s showing 
of disparate impact has created.”).  
 4. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, 
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 9 (2009), 
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE 
%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf. 
 5. Id. at 3. 
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as to the applicable standard for disparate impact claims.6   
Adding to the confusion, the U.S. Supreme Court has largely 
stayed out of the matter.7  In the last twenty-five years, the Supreme 
Court has missed three opportunities to conclusively decide 
whether the FHA includes a disparate impact standard and to 
define a sensible test.  In 1988, the Court reserved judgment on the 
disparate impact issue in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, 
NAACP.8  And in 2003, the Court nearly had an opportunity in City 
of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation,9 but the 
disparate impact claim was dropped after certiorari was granted.   
In November 2011, the Court decided to take up the issue by 
granting certiorari10 for the City of St. Paul, Minnesota from an 
Eighth Circuit case, Gallagher v. Magner.11  The two questions 
presented in the petition for certiorari were: (1) whether disparate 
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA; and (2) if such claims 
are cognizable, how they should be analyzed.12  But in February 
2012, the City of St. Paul withdrew its petition, resulting in yet 
another missed opportunity for the Court to decide on the 
disparate impact issue in housing discrimination law.13  As a 
consequence, the question of whether the Supreme Court will 
recognize disparate impact claims under the FHA will continue to 
go unanswered and the circuit split on the application of a 
disparate impact standard will continue for the foreseeable future. 
 The first part of this article will trace the background of 
disparate impact and the FHA.14  The second part will provide an 
 
 6. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 2, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-1032), available 
at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Brief-05-19-11-
154207.pdf. 
 7. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 4. 
 8. 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
 9. 538 U.S. 188 (2003). 
 10. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012). 
 11. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and 
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
 12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 
(2011) (No. 10-1032), available at http://www.justalandlord.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2011/02/1102-Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiori.pdf, dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012).  
 13. See No. 10-1032, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1032.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
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overview of Gallagher.15  The third part of this article will discuss the 
current problems with disparate impact under the FHA.16  The 
fourth part will recommend how the Court, if ever given the 
chance, should rule by providing legal and policy reasons for 
recognition of disparate impact under the FHA, as well as some 
suggested considerations.17  The article will conclude with a 
recommendation that disparate impact under the FHA should be 
defined similarly to disparate impact in the employment 
discrimination context as established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.18 
I. DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE FHA 
A. History of the FHA 
1. Need for the FHA 
 Prior to the FHA, segregated housing in the United States 
persisted because of racially restrictive zoning regulations and 
covenants, segregated public housing projects, realtors steering 
minorities away from white neighborhoods, and voluntary 
segregation.19  White flight only made matters worse.20  
Senator Walter Mondale, who introduced the original FHA 
bill, argued that it was “necessary to eliminate discriminatory 
practices of property owners, real estate brokers, builders, and 
home financers.”21  Mondale intended the FHA to replace the 




 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing 
Act Claims: Landlord Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1971, 1975 (2010). 
 20. White Flight, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_flight (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 21. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing 
114 CONG. REC. S2272–84 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1968)). 
 22. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968)). 
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2. Building Support for the FHA 
Ultimately, the FHA was passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968.23  But two years prior to its passage, the issue of fair 
housing languished in Congress.24  It was a divisive issue, 
“prompt[ing] the most vicious mail [President Lyndon B. Johnson] 
received on any subject.”25   
The lobbying efforts of two men turned the tide, however.  
The first was Senator Edward Brooke, the first African-American 
Senator to be elected by popular vote.26  Partnering with Senator 
Edward Kennedy, Senator Brooke spoke of his personal experience 
returning from World War II and being denied housing for his 
family due to his race.27  Incidentally, a similar problem was 
reoccurring with the Vietnam War.  In particular, wartime 
casualties fell disproportionately on racial minorities and the 
families of fallen soldiers of color were being denied housing due 
to their race.28 
The second individual was Martin Luther King, Jr., who 
became closely associated with fair housing legislation because he 
organized the Chicago open housing marches, which occurred in 
1966.29  As of March 1968, according to President Johnson’s special 
assistant for domestic affairs, there was “no hope” of passage of the 
FHA in the House.30  But President Johnson used King’s 
assassination as an opportunity to finally push the fair housing bill 
 
 23. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–19, 82 Stat. 73, 81–-89 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§3601–19 (2006)). 
 24. History of Fair Housing, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD 
?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2012).  
 25. Joseph Califano, Jr., A Complex Partnership / MLK and LBJ Needed Each 
Other—and They Knew It, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 15, 2008.  Public resentment 
toward fair housing efforts was also felt by Martin Luther King, Jr., who remarked 
that when he advocated for fair housing in Chicago he had “never seen such 
hate—not in Mississippi or Alabama—as I see here in Chicago.”  Id.  
 26. Edward Brooke, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Brooke 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 27. History of Fair Housing, supra note 24.  Senator Brooke additionally noted 
that his problem was not unique—African-Americans could not move to better 
neighborhoods because they were “surrounded by a pattern of discrimination 
based on individual prejudice, often institutionalized by business and industry, 
and Government practices.”  114 CONG. REC. 2526 (1968). 
 28. History of Fair Housing, supra note 24.  
 29. Monroe H. Little, Jr., More Than a Dreamer: Remembering Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., 41 IND. L. REV. 523, 534 (2008) (describing the effect of King’s marches 
on the passage of the fair housing bill). 
 30. Califano, supra note 25. 
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through Congress, as a “last tribute to King.”31  Just seven days after 
King’s assassination on April 4, 1968,32 the FHA was quickly passed 
without debate.33   
3. FHA Today 
 The FHA today makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any 
person in the . . . sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”34  Protection 
from discrimination is also extended to the handicapped in a few 
instances, such as in the context of advertisements35 or denials of 
the availability of a rental dwelling.36  There is no express language 
in the FHA requiring a showing of intent, in part because Congress 
thought doing so would make it too difficult to show 
discrimination.37  There is also no express language in the statute 
authorizing discrimination claims based on showings of disparate 
impact.38  Such ambiguity has opened the door for judicial 
interpretation. 
B. The Roots of Disparate Impact  
1. The Court’s First Recognition of Disparate Impact  
 The concept of disparate impact comes from employment 
discrimination law.  In 1971, the landmark Supreme Court opinion 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.39 interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
 
 31. Id.  
 32. Matthew Jordan Cochran, Fairness in Disparity: Challenging the Application of 
Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing Claims Against Insurers, 21 GEO. MASON U. 
CIV. RTS. L.J. 159, 161 (2011). 
 33. History of Fair Housing, supra note 24. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006). 
 35. Id. § 3604(c) (prohibiting, for example, rental ads that exclude applicants 
based on a handicap). 
 36. Id. § 3604(d) (prohibiting, for example, a landlord from expressing the 
unavailability of a rental dwelling to a handicapped person when it is in fact 
available). 
 37. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 11–12 (explaining that Congress 
debated an amendment from Senator Baker that would have found liability under 
the FHA where intentional discrimination occurred, but that this amendment was 
defeated due to the recognition of difficulties in producing proof of intent, which 
would have raised the likelihood of chances for discrimination). 
 38. Id. at 9 (“The text of the FHA’s substantive provisions (§§ 3604–3606 and 
3617) does not explicitly state whether impact claims are or are not cognizable.”). 
 39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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Rights Act40 to include a discriminatory effect standard.41   
 In Griggs, a group of African-American employees in North 
Carolina brought suit against their employer, Duke Power 
Company, claiming that their employment practices violated the 
Civil Rights Act.42   
Prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Duke had a policy of 
relegating African-American employees to a single department, 
“Labor,” where the highest-paying jobs paid less than the lowest-
paying jobs in any of the other “white” departments.43  But after the 
Civil Rights Act passed, Duke changed its race-based employment 
assignments to a policy of requiring either a high school diploma 
or passing a standardized general intelligence test to either be 
employed in, or transferred to, certain jobs, primarily ones with 
higher wages.44   
Plaintiffs argued that degree and testing requirements 
disproportionately affected African-Americans because they were 
less likely than whites to have diplomas or pass the intelligence test.  
In 1960 in North Carolina, thirty-four percent of white males 
completed high school, compared to only twelve percent of 
African-American males.45  Further, fifty-eight percent of whites 
passed Duke’s standardized intelligence tests, compared to only six 
percent of African-Americans.46   
Plaintiffs also argued that degree and testing requirements did 
not relate to job performance because the percentage of white 
employees promoted without high school diplomas was nearly the 
same as the percentage of non-graduates in the entire white work 
force.47  In other words, high school graduates were no more likely 
than non-graduates to be promoted. 
Duke, on the other hand, argued that they lacked intent to 
 
 40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241 (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)). 
 41. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32 (“If an employment practice which operates to 
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is 
prohibited. . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”). 
 42. Id. at 424. 
 43. Id. at 427. 
 44. Id. at 427–28. 
 45. Id. at 431 n.6 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
CENSUS OF POPULATION:1960 VOLUME I CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION PART 
35 35-167 tbl.47 (1963)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 431–32 n.7. 
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discriminate against African-American employees,48 and that 
section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act provided for a right to 
condition promotions or transfers on passing certain tests.49 
The Court in Griggs sided with plaintiffs, holding that 
“Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”50  Accordingly, 
Duke’s intention for implementing testing requirements was not a 
dispositive factor for proving or disproving employment 
discrimination.  Instead, what mattered was the impact caused by 
the testing requirements. 
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to prohibit 
testing or measuring procedures, as long as they are a “reasonable 
measure of job performance” and “measure the person for the job 
and not the person in the abstract.”51  Since the diploma and 
testing requirements were not “significantly related to successful 
job performance” and disqualified African-Americans at a 
substantially higher rate than white applicants, Duke’s policy was 
held to be discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.52   
2. Codification of Disparate Impact in Employment Discrimination 
Law 
The burden of proof in Title VII disparate impact cases was 
discussed by the Court in 1989 in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 53 
and codified in an amendment to the Civil Rights Act in 1991.54  
Under the current statute, an unlawful employment practice based 
on disparate impact may be established in only one of two ways: (1) 
the complainant demonstrates that an employment practice causes 
 
 48. Id. at 432. 
 49. Id. at 433 (referring to Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 
703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006)), 
which allowed the use of tests, as long as they did not discriminate based on race). 
 50. Id. at 432. 
 51. Id. at 436. 
 52. Id. at 424. 
 53. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding that defendant employer the has 
burden of production of showing business justification for an employment 
practice, while the burden of persuasion remains with the disparate-impact 
plaintiff). 
 54. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1074–1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)).  The stated 
purpose of the amendment was “to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact 
actions.”  Id. 
9
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a disparate impact and the employer fails to show that its practice is 
job-related and consistent with business necessity;55 or (2) if the 
employer refused to adopt an alternative employment practice that 
complainant demonstrated (in accordance with pre-Wards Cove 
law)56 is less discriminatory.57 
C. Disparate Impact Evolution in Housing Discrimination Law 
1. The Supreme Court’s First FHA Decision: Trafficante v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. 
 Four years after the enactment of the FHA, and just one year 
after Griggs, the Supreme Court in 1972 issued its first FHA 
decision in Trafficante.58  The plaintiffs, who were tenants at an 
apartment complex, claimed that their landlord discriminated 
against non-white rental applicants.59  Plaintiffs asserted that they 
had: (1) “lost the social benefits of living in an integrated 
community;” (2) “missed business and professional advantages” 
from not living with members of minority groups; and (3) “suffered 
embarrassment and economic damage in social, business, and 
professional activities from being ‘stigmatized’ as residents of a 
‘white ghetto.’”60  Further, plaintiffs argued that they had standing 
to bring an FHA claim because they fell under the FHA’s definition 
of “aggrieved persons,” which includes any person who either 
claims to be injured, or will be injured, by a discriminatory housing 
practice.61  
 Even though plaintiffs were not directly discriminated 
against by their landlord based on race, the Court found that they 
 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 56. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (overturning the standard for showing alternative 
practices set by Wards Cove by stating such demonstrations “shall be in accordance 
with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989,” which was the day before Wards Cove was 
decided). 
 57. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 
1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven after such a showing [of business necessity], 
the plaintiff may still overcome a proffered business necessity defense by 
demonstrating that there exist alternative policies with lesser discriminatory effects 
that would be comparably as effective at serving the employer’s identified business 
needs.” (emphasis added)). 
 58. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 59. Id. at 206–08. 
 60. Id. at 208. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2006). 
10
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had standing.62  The Court noted that the FHA’s language is “broad 
and inclusive”63 and should be given “generous construction.”64  
The Court justified a broad interpretation for standing by 
reasoning that barriers must be removed to private suits under the 
FHA because private suits are the best enforcement mechanism—
particularly when considering that the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) does not have enforcement powers, 
and the Attorney General has a small staff for fair housing 
litigation.65  
2. The Initial Circuit Court Decision Regarding Disparate Impact 
Under the FHA: United States v. City of Black Jack 
 Following Griggs (Title VII allows for showings of 
discriminatory effect)66 and Trafficante (the FHA should be broadly 
interpreted),67 the Eighth Circuit became the first federal appellate 
court to find an FHA violation based on disparate impact.68  In 
United States v. City of Black Jack, a municipal zoning ordinance that 
prohibited construction of any new multifamily dwellings was 
challenged on the grounds that it denied persons housing on the 
basis of race in violation of the FHA.69  At the time, Black Jack, 
Missouri was “virtually all white,” with a black population of 
between one and two percent.70  Neighboring St. Louis, by 
comparison, was about forty percent black, with a pupil population 
of approximately sixty-five percent in the city’s school district.71  
Furthermore, about forty percent of black families in the area, 
compared to fourteen percent of white families, were living in 
overcrowded housing.72 
 Relying on Griggs for the proposition that Congress intended 
Title VII to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate 
 
 62. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212. 
 63. Id. at 209. 
 64. Id. at 212. 
 65. Id. at 210–11. 
 66. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
 67. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209. 
 68. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 3. 
 69. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 70. Id. at 1183. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification[s],”73 the 
Eighth Circuit in Black Jack concluded that “such barriers must also 
give way in the field of housing.”74  The court went on to declare 
that a prima facie case of racial discrimination may be proven with 
no more than a defendant’s conduct “actually or predictably 
result[ing] in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a 
discriminatory effect . . . . Effect, and not motivation, is the 
touchstone . . . .”75 
 Under this standard, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
municipal zoning ordinance had a discriminatory effect because 
prohibiting construction of affordable multifamily dwellings would 
“contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community 
which was [ninety-nine] percent white.”76  Since discriminatory 
effect had been shown, the Eighth Circuit shifted the burden to the 
municipal defendant “to demonstrate that its conduct was 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.”77  
Because Black Jack could not show a compelling governmental 
interest, the Eighth Circuit held that the ordinance violated the 
FHA.78 
3. Development of Disparate Impact Since Black Jack 
 In the years since Black Jack, a strong consensus has emerged 
among the circuit courts that the FHA includes a disparate impact 
standard.79  Today, every circuit uses the disparate impact 
standard.80  But, due to a lack of guidance from the Supreme 
 
 73. Id. at 1184 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1184–85. 
 76. Id. at 1186. 
 77. Id. at 1185 & n.4 (stating that this rule was drawn from “cases involving 
equal protection challenges”). 
 78. Id. at 1188. 
 79. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 3. 
 80. See, e.g., 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 
F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 
(1st Cir. 2000); Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 745–46 (9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side 
Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1250–51 (10th 
Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934–35 (2d 
Cir. 1988), aff’d in part per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 
482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 
1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Betsey v. 
Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/1
  
1446 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:4 
Court, the circuit courts have “developed substantively different 
standards” for judging FHA disparate impact claims.81  In fact, 
three different standards have emerged among the circuits:82 a 
“balance-of-factors test,”83 a “burden-shifting analysis,”84 and a 
“hybrid test.”85 
 Disparate impact under the FHA has also been adopted by 
HUD.  In a 1993 administrative decision, for example, the HUD 
Secretary found that a “disparate impact, if proven, would establish 
a violation of the Act.”86  Furthermore, HUD’s “Complaint Intake, 
Investigation, and Conciliation Handbook” recognizes that 
disparate impact may be used to show a violation of the FHA.87  
 
F.2d 126, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington 
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–85 (8th 
Cir. 1974). 
 81. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 2.  
 82. Id. at 2–4. 
 83. The “balance-of-factors test” is used in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits.  Id. at 3.  The following factors are considered: “(1) the strength of 
plaintiffs’ showing of discriminatory impact; (2) a quantum of evidence of 
discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant’s interest in the challenged conduct; and 
(4) whether the plaintiff seeks affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain 
defendants from interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing.”  
Id. (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 84. The “burden-shifting analysis” is used in the Third, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits.  Id.  The analysis in the Third Circuit requires: “(1) plaintiff must show 
disparate impact; (2) defendant must establish justification for the action; and (3) 
defendant must prove no reasonable alternative means was available.”  Id. (citing 
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977)).  The analysis in 
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is the same for the first and second prongs, but the 
burden for the third prong shifts to the plaintiff to show that a viable alternative 
means was available.  Id. at 3–4 (citing Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148). 
 85. The “hybrid test” is used in the First and Second Circuits.  Id. at 4.  The 
“hybrid test” requires that “(1) plaintiff must present a prima facie case of disparate 
impact; (2) defendant must ‘prove that its actions furthered . . . a legitimate, bona 
fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with 
less discriminatory effect’; (3) the court considers whether any evidence of 
discriminatory intent was presented; and (4) the court considers whether the 
plaintiff seeks affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain defendants from 
interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing.”  Id. (citing 
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir. 
1988), aff’d in part per curiam Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 
488 U.S. 15 (1988)).  
 86. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, Fair 
Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) ¶ 25,053 (July 19, 1993), available at 1993 WL 
307069, at *5. 
 87. HUD, FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HANDBOOK: TITLE VIII 
COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION, AND CONCILIATION HANDBOOK (8024.01), Part 3-
5-A-1, at 3-25 (1995), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips 
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 Although there is consensus among the circuit courts and 
HUD that a violation of the FHA can be shown with disparate 
impact, the Supreme Court has remained out of the debate.88  The 
Court has held that a violation of the FHA can be found when 
discriminatory intent is shown.89  But the Court has never held that 
an FHA violation can be found with a showing of disparate 
impact.90  
II. GALLAGHER V. MAGNER 
The Gallagher case provided a great opportunity for the Court 
to settle the circuit split on how disparate impact is applied, if at all, 
under the FHA.  Even though the petitioner, the City of St. Paul, 
requested dismissal from the Court, the case presents a real-world 
lens into how disparate impact has been used and suggests some 
limits.  Therefore, the Gallagher case is used below to discuss 
disparate impact under the FHA and why the Court should 
recognize it someday.   
 
/handbooks/fheh/80241/80241c3-1FHEH.pdf (stating that HUD’s jurisdiction 
over a complaint requires showing a violation of the FHA either by discriminatory 
motive or discriminatory effect); id. Part 2-4-A, at 2-27 to 2-28, available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/fheh/80241/80241c2FH
EH.pdf (“[A] respondent may be held liable for violating the Fair Housing Act 
even if his action against the complainant was not even partly motivated by illegal 
considerations. . . . These cases are sometimes called ‘discriminatory impact’ or 
‘discriminatory effect’ cases, because their principal focus is on the impact or 
effect of the respondent’s policy rather than on his intent.”). 
 88. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 4. 
 89. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (1977).  The Court stated that “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id.  The 
Court used as precedent showings of violations under the Equal Protection Clause 
because no precedent for violations of the FHA existed at the time and the Court 
thought such precedent was an appropriate analogy for two reasons: first, the FHA 
similarly prohibited discrimination; and second, the Court had previously applied 
this rule in discrimination cases involving schools, election districting, and jury 
selection.  See id.  For such showings of “discriminatory intent,” the Court 
articulated a four-factor test: “(1) the racial impact of the decision; (2) the 
historical background of the decision, particularly where it reveals a series of 
official actions taken for invidious purposes; (3) the specific sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision—including departures from the normal 
procedural sequence; and (4) the legislative or administrative history—especially 
where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking 
body, or minutes of its meetings.”  Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of 
Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 635 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 
U.S. at 266-68), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 538 U.S. 188 (2003). 
 90. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 4. 
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A. Background Facts 
In 2003, the City of St. Paul established the Department of 
Neighborhood Housing and Property Improvement (DNHPI) to 
administer and enforce its housing code.91  The mission of the 
DNHPI was to “keep the city clean, keep its housing habitable, and 
make [its] neighborhoods the safest and most livable [of] anywhere 
in Minnesota.”92  The director of the DNHPI sought to fulfill the 
mission by conducting “proactive sweeps,” as requested by City 
District Councils,93 and by responding to neighborhood 
complaints.94  The DNHPI director drafted procedural guidelines, 
but since “universal application” was impossible, housing inspectors 
had discretion in application of their rules.95 
Rental property owners brought suit against the City of St. Paul 
challenging the enforcement of its housing code.96  These owners 
rented properties to low-income households, which primarily 
consisted of persons of protected classes (about sixty to seventy 
percent of their tenant base was African-American).97  
B. U.S. District Court —Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 
2d 987 (2008) 
 In U.S. District Court, the owners brought a number of 
claims against the City: (1) disparate impact and disparate 
treatment claims under the FHA; (2) an equal protection claim; 
and (3) a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Act claim.98  The district court ultimately granted summary 
 
 91. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 
2010), reh’g en banc denied reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
 92. Id. at 993. 
 93. The city of St. Paul has seventeen district councils responsible for 
“planning and advising on the physical, economic, and social development of their 
areas; identifying needs; initiating community programs; recruiting volunteers; 
and sponsoring community events.” District Councils, SAINTPAULMINNESOTA, 
http://www.stpaul.gov/index.aspx?NID=1859 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 94. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 993. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 991–92. 
 97. Id. at 995. 
 98. Id. at 992.  Additional claims were brought by the owners, but the court 
found they either were related to the other claims or did not warrant much 
discussion due to unfounded assertions.  Id. 
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judgment for the City of St. Paul on all claims,99 but this article will 
focus only on the disparate impact claim. 
 The owners argued that the City took a “heavy enforcement” 
and “code to the max” approach that increased their business costs, 
which reduced the supply of “affordable housing” and thus had a 
disparate impact on racial minorities in violation of the FHA.100  
They cited a finding that the City’s housing code was more strict 
than the federal Housing Quality Standards (HQS) laid out in 24 
C.F.R. § 982.401 (2010).101  To support their claim of disparate 
impact, the owners provided evidence that a shortage of affordable 
housing existed in the City and that there was an increase in 
foreclosed buildings in the City that were disproportionately renter-
occupied.102  The owners conceded that the DNHPI’s objectives 
were “legitimate and non-discriminatory” and that enforcement was 
manifestly related and “necessary” to achieving such objectives, but 
argued that the HQS was a viable alternative to the City’s housing 
code.103    
 Conversely, the City argued that the owners had not 
presented a legitimate claim under the Eighth Circuit’s disparate 
impact standard.104  Specifically, the City claimed that the owners 
had not shown a prima facie case because their claims of less 
affordable housing and more vacant homes could not be traced to 
enforcement of the housing code.105  Further, the City argued that 
 
 99. Id. at 1020–21. 
 100. Id. at 995–96. 
 101. Id. at 997 n.6.  The owners cited a finding from the City’s fire department 
that the municipal housing code was stricter than the HQS on eighty-two percent 
of items compared.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 998. 
 103. Id. at 999. 
 104. Id. at 997.  The Eighth Circuit standard for determining disparate impact 
involves three steps that shift the burden between plaintiff and defendant.  First, 
the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the objected-to action results in, or can be 
predicted to result in, a disparate impact upon protected classes compared to a 
relevant population.”  Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 
F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2005).  Second, if the plaintiff can show a disparate impact, 
then the defendant “must demonstrate that the proposed action has a ‘manifest 
relationship’ to . . . legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objectives and ‘is 
justifiable on the ground it is necessary to’ the attainment of these objectives.”  Id. 
(quoting Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir. 
2003)).  Third, if the defendant can show a necessary means to a legitimate policy 
objective, then plaintiff must “show that a viable alternative means is available to 
achieve those legitimate policy objectives without discriminatory effects.”  Id. at 
903.  
 105. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss4/1
  
1450 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:4 
code enforcement was related to legitimate, non-discriminatory 
policy objectives of providing clean, safe, and livable housing.106  
 The court granted summary judgment for the City, holding 
that the owners failed to establish a disparate impact claim under 
the FHA for two reasons.107  First, the owners failed to offer 
evidence of “what rents are under the City's housing code, what 
rents would be under the HQS, and the percentages of African-
Americans and non-African-Americans who could not afford to 
rent in the City because the City enforced its housing code rather 
than the HQS.”108  Second, the owners failed to show that the City’s 
code enforcement “caused or contributed” to the affordable 
housing shortage or that it caused increased vacancies or 
foreclosures.109  Rather, the owners’ showings were countered with 
evidence that insufficient federal funding contributed to the 
affordable housing shortage and that foreclosures (resulting in 
vacancies) were caused by predatory lending practices, unforeseen 
life events, and increasing interest rates.110 
 The court found that even if the owners had shown a prima 
facie case, they could still not prevail on their disparate impact 
claim because their suggested alternative was not viable.111  The 
HQS, as a suggested alternative to the City’s housing code, was not 
viable because it did not regulate exterior conditions (e.g., 
sanitation, extermination, and lighting), which “affect the safety 
and cleanliness” of the City.  And no evidence was shown that 
adopting the HQS would result in greater availability of low-income 
housing or rent decreases.112  For these reasons, the HQS 
alternative would not allow the City to achieve its policy objectives 
without discriminatory effects.113   
 
 
 106. Id. at 998–99. 
 107. Id. at 992. 
 108. Id. at 997–98. 
 109. Id. at 998. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 999. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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C. 8th Circuit I — Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (2010)114  
 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment 
on the disparate impact claim, but affirmed on all other claims.115  
The court found that the owners had in fact presented a prima 
facie case and that the issue of a viable alternative was a fact 
question, which made summary judgment improper.116  
In regard to the owners’ prima facie case, the court concluded 
that enough evidence was presented to withstand summary 
judgment.117  The owners presented evidence supporting an 
affordable housing shortage, racial minorities disproportionately 
constituting low-income households, increased costs for landlords 
of low-income tenants resulting from the City’s code enforcement, 
and decreased affordable housing resulting from the City’s code 
enforcement.118  The court then inferred from this evidence that 
the City’s code enforcement burdened the owners, which 
burdened the tenants, and decreased an already short supply of 
affordable housing, which disproportionately affected racial 
minorities since they were more likely to be low-income and 
dependent on low-income housing.119  The court said that 
“[t]hough there is not a single document that connects the dots of 
[the owners’] disparate impact claim, it is enough that each 
analytic step is reasonable and supported by evidence.”120 
Further, the appellate court determined that the district court 
was mistaken in requiring a “before-and-after cost-of-rent 
comparison” because it is one way to show disparate impact, but it 
is “not the only way.”121 
In regard to the owners’ presentation of a viable alternative to 
the City’s code enforcement, the court concluded that there was a 
genuine dispute of fact and thus the issue was improperly disposed 
 
 114. It is unclear why on appeal the named plaintiff changed from Steinhauser 
to Gallagher, but it appears that Steinhauser was not included as a litigant on 
appeal. 
 115. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and 
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
 116. Id. at 837. 
 117. Id. at 837. 
 118. Id. at 834–35. 
 119. Id. at 835. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 837. 
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of on summary judgment.122  Ignored by the district court, the 
owners suggested the City’s previous housing code enforcement 
program, Problem Properties 2000, (PP2000) was a viable 
alternative.123  But there was disagreement between the City and the 
owners over how much reduction in impact on protected class 
members PP2000 would have.124  The court ruled that this was a 
factual dispute and declined to analyze the viability of PP2000 as an 
alternative.125 
D. 8th Circuit II — Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380 (2010) 
The petition for rehearing en banc and rehearing by the panel 
was denied, but a lengthy dissenting opinion was provided.126  Two 
issues were suggested for analysis by the dissent.  First, the basis for 
disparate impact analysis under the FHA should be examined.127  
The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on this matter and there 
has been “little consideration” in the Eighth Circuit of the basis for 
liability shown by disparate impact.128 
Additionally, the dissent pointed to a recent Supreme Court 
decision that cast doubt on justifications for allowing disparate 
impact showings under the FHA based on Griggs.129  In 2005, Smith 
v. City of Jackson held that disparate impact is cognizable under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).130  The Supreme 
Court held that one section of the ADEA (section 4(a)(2)) allows a 
disparate impact standard because the statutory language is 
“identical” to the language of Title VII in Griggs,131 while it also 
 
 122. Id. at 838. 
 123. Id. at 837. 
 124. Id. at 838. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 127. Id. at 381 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 382–83. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 131. Id. at 236–38.  The statutory language interpreted in Griggs included: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971).  The “identical” language 
of section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA (now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2006)) 
declared it unlawful for an employer “‘to limit, segregate, or classify his employees 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
19
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found that another section (section 4(a)(1)) had “key textual 
differences” and does not include a disparate impact standard.132  
The problem, however, is that the statutory language in the ADEA 
held to not include disparate impact is similar to the language used 
in the FHA.133 
Third, the dissent stated that if disparate impact analysis is 
based on the purpose of the FHA, then it is worth considering 
whether that purpose extends to make a city liable for aggressive 
housing code enforcement.134  The circuit court had determined 
when application of disparate impact analysis was appropriate in 
other contexts, but this was unchartered territory and so the dissent 
wanted a rehearing to discuss this.135 
E. Petition for Certiorari 
The City submitted a petition for writ of certiorari in response 
to the Eighth Circuit’s decision to allow the owners’ case to 
proceed to trial based on its finding that sufficient evidence of 
disparate impact was shown.136  The City argued that a circuit split 
over disparate impact under the FHA has resulted in inconsistent 
applications of the FHA across the country.137  The City, explaining 
that landlords in Los Angeles can avoid maintenance requirements 
by claiming the municipality is violating the FHA, while landlords 
in Milwaukee cannot, argued, “[t]he FHA should not be a vehicle 
to allow landlords to rent dilapidated and unsafe housing to 
 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s age . . . .’”  Smith, 544 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted). 
 132. Smith, 544 U.S. at 235–36 & n.6.  The language section  4(a)(1) of the 
ADEA (now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)) that seemingly discourages 
disparate impact included that it be unlawful “‘to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s age . . . .’”  Smith, 544 U.S. at 248–50 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). 
 133. Gallagher, 636 F.3d at 383 (Colloton, J., dissenting).  The language of the 
FHA, which is similar to section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA (found to not allow disparate 
impact claims), provides that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the 
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006). 
 134. Gallagher, 636 F.3d at 383-84 (Colloton, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 384. 
 136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.  
 137. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 1. 
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minorities.”138 
The City requested that the Court determine whether or not 
disparate impact applies under the FHA, and if it does, that a 
uniform test for all circuits be advanced.139  The City’s petition for 
certiorari was granted in November 2011,140 but the City requested 
dismissal of its petition in February 2012.141  Bowing to “pressure 
from civil rights and housing advocates nationwide,” St. Paul Mayor 
Chris Coleman revoked the City’s petition.142  Mayor Coleman 
feared an increasingly conservative and pro-business Court would 
likely have delivered “Pyrrhic victory” for the City that would 
weaken disparate impact in civil rights enforcement.143  Even the 
FHA’s principal sponsor, Walter Mondale, was worried the Court 
would find disparate impact under the FHA unconstitutional, 
which “would largely de-fang the Fair Housing Act."144   
Whatever the reasons, the Gallagher plaintiffs will still have 
their day in court—it will just be in federal district court rather 
than in front of the Supreme Court.145  The unfortunate reality of 
the missed opportunity for the Court in Gallagher is that the status 
of disparate impact claims under the FHA and the standards that 
might apply to such claims remain unsettled at the national level.  
Gallagher demonstrated the need for resolution of the FHA 
disparate impact problem in this country.  Below is a discussion of 
this problem, followed by recommendations for the Court when 
they are next faced with deciding whether FHA violations can be 
shown with disparate impact. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
Despite the seemingly strong consensus that a disparate impact 
standard exists under the FHA, the federal circuit courts disagree 
 
 138. Id. at 5. 
 139. Id. at 10–11. 
 140. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2012). 
 141. No. 10-1032, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1032.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 142. Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight from High Court, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 
10, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084.html. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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on its application.146  Case in point: the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits use a “balance-of-factors test”;147 while the Third, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits use a “burden-shifting analysis”;148 and 
the First and Second Circuits use a “hybrid test.”149  Due to this 
circuit split, Gallagher may have been decided differently had it 
occurred in another circuit, even though the FHA is a federal 
statute that is supposed to be applied nationally.  This lack of a 
uniform standard has caused a number of problems. 
A. Different Standards, Different Outcomes: Tenth Circuit 
 Under Tenth Circuit precedent, the City of St. Paul may not 
have had its summary judgment motion reversed as it had in the 
Eighth Circuit.150  In Reinhart v. Lincoln County, the Tenth Circuit 
held that plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case of 
disparate impact because it was insufficient “to show that (1) a 
regulation would increase housing costs and (2) members of a 
protected group tend to be less wealthy than others.”151  The City of 
St. Paul cited Reinhart in arguing that the owners could not just 
show that enforcement of the “Housing Code increases the cost of 
low-income housing and that African-Americans tend to have lower 
incomes.”152  The Eighth Circuit did not buy the City’s argument 
and ultimately rejected Reinhart, reasoning that “the existence of a 
significant statistical disparity, even one resulting from economic 
inequality, is sufficient to create a prima facie case.”153  Thus, under 
the Tenth Circuit’s higher standard for disparate impact showings, 
the City likely would have had its summary judgment motion 
affirmed. 
 
 146. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 1; see also Brief for Int’l Municipal 
Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 2 (“Lacking the Court’s guidance, the Circuit 
Courts have developed substantively different standards against which to judge 
such FHA standards.”); supra notes 82–85. 
 147. See supra note 83. 
 148. See supra note 84. 
 149. See supra note 85. 
 150. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 7. 
 151. Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 152. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 836 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and 
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
 153. Id. (citing Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp. 1169, 1180 
n.23 (E.D. Va. 1995)). 
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B. Different Standards, Different Outcomes: Second Circuit 
Similarly, under Second Circuit precedent, the City of St. Paul 
may not have lost in the Eighth Circuit.  In Tsombanidis v. West 
Haven Fire Department, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
plaintiffs had not shown a prima facie case of disparate impact 
because they did not prove a quantitative or qualitative comparison 
between a protected class and the non-protected population.154  
The court reasoned that although some cases may not require 
statistics, “there must be some analytical mechanism to determine 
disproportionate impact,”155 and that a “plaintiff has not met its 
burden if it merely raises an inference of discriminatory impact.”156  
 The Eighth Circuit, however, twisted the language and logic 
of the Tsombanidis decision when it allowed a lower standard for a 
showing of a disparate impact claim in Gallagher.  First of all, 
despite the Second Circuit disallowing inferences of disparate 
impact,157 the Eighth Circuit allowed such inferences by concluding 
that “[t]hough there is not a single document that connects the 
dots of [the owners’] disparate impact claim, it is enough that each 
analytic step is reasonable and supported by evidence.”158  
Essentially, the Eighth Circuit allowed an inference of 
discriminatory impact, which the Second Circuit disallows. 
Secondly, while the Second Circuit requires either a 
quantitative or qualitative comparison between protected and non-
protected classes, the Eighth Circuit similarly held that a “statistical 
comparison” is “not the only way” to show “disproportionate adverse 
effect.”159 The Eighth Circuit in Gallagher, unlike the district court 
in Steinhauser, did not require that the owners provide a 
quantitative “before-and-after cost-of-rent comparison.”160  Rather, 
the Eighth Circuit was satisfied that enough evidence (without a 
statistical comparison) was offered to withstand summary 
judgment.161  Thus, the Eighth Circuit allowed a lower standard for 
disparate impact because it did not require an analytical 
comparison between protected and non-protected classes. 
 
 154. Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 577–78 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 155. Id. at 576. 
 156. Id. at 575. 
 157. See id. at 575. 
 158. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 835. 
 159. Id. at 837. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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But even if the Eighth Circuit did require a qualitative 
comparison, the Gallagher owners likely would not have met the 
Second Circuit’s standard.  Such a standard would have required 
the Gallagher owners to qualitatively show that the average 
protected-class person in St. Paul had a greater “need” for 
affordable housing than the average non-protected-class person in 
the city.162  The Gallagher owners presented evidence that, 
compared to all renter households, a majority of renters were racial 
minorities163 and that of all those on public housing waiting lists, a 
majority of them were African-American.164  But the owners did not 
show that racial minorities (a protected class) in St. Paul “need” 
affordable housing any more than the average low-income person 
(a non-protected class) in the city.  Although subtle, there is a 
difference between showing that the average racial minority group 
has a greater “need” for affordable housing and just showing that a 
majority of renters and public housing applicants are racial 
minorities because there is no comparison to the racial minority 
population as a whole, beyond just renters and public housing 
applicants. 
C. Lack of a National Standard is Unfair 
 Prior to revoking its petition, the City of St. Paul requested 
that the Court eliminate the circuit split and “harmonize the 
circuits” to correct this unfairness.165  The City argued that the 
circuit split is unfair because landlords in one circuit should not be 
able to avoid municipal maintenance standards through disparate 
impact claims under the FHA (as was the case in Gallagher), while 
landlords in another circuit have to abide by them.166  Additionally, 
the International Municipal Lawyers Association agreed with the 
 
 162. In Tsombanidis, the plaintiffs were owners of a group home for recovering 
alcoholics that claimed it was the target of the city’s discriminatory application of 
the fire code, which prohibited six unrelated individuals from living together 
unless expensive modifications were made to the home.  Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 
571–72.  The court said that since plaintiffs did not provide any statistical 
comparison they could have provided a qualitative comparison showing that the 
average recovering alcoholic in the city had a greater need (qualitatively) for 
group living than does the average non-recovering alcoholic resident.  Id. at 577. 
 163. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 834. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 5. 
 166. Id.; see also Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 5–6 
(arguing that while the owners’ disparate impact claim was sustained in Gallagher 
in the Eighth Circuit, their claim would not have survived in the Fourth Circuit). 
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City and argued that “[w]ithout this [Supreme] Court’s resolution 
of the Circuit Court conflict the law will remain incapable of 
serving its intended purpose: establishing a singular anti-
discrimination standard equally applicable across the country.”167   
D. Judicial Inefficiency 
 The lack of a clear national standard may create judicial 
inefficiencies due to confusion over the appropriate analysis to 
apply to disparate impact claims.  Dubious claims may proceed to 
trial and legitimate claims may be dismissed on summary judgment.  
Regardless of the validity of the owners’ claim in Gallagher, a clear 
standard would have avoided judicial bickering over the 
appropriate standard for disparate impact.168  Similar situations 
have played out in other circuits as well.169  
E. Less Safe Housing 
 Another problem is that in circuits with low standards for 
disparate impact showings under the FHA, municipalities may be 
reluctant to enforce stricter housing codes for fear that 
enforcement may open them up to increased litigation.170  If 
municipalities relax enforcement of housing codes on low-income-
tenant properties, which are already in poor condition, then the 
inevitable result is even less safe housing.171  Maintaining the status 
quo allows the preservation of lower standards in some circuits, but 
establishing a national standard at some middle ground would at 
least raise the standard in these circuits, which would theoretically 
free cities up to enforce their housing codes against all properties 
not in compliance. 
 
 
 167. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 8. 
 168. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 833–38. 
 169. See, e.g., Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount 
Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011); Cmty. Servs. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 
170 (3d Cir. 2005); Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
 170. Interview with James E. Wilkinson, Attorney, Legal Aid Society of 
Minneapolis, in St. Paul, Minn. (July 29, 2011). 
 171. Id. 
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IV. HOW THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD SOMEDAY RULE 
If ever given the opportunity, the Supreme Court should 
recognize disparate impact as a valid legal theory for showing 
violations of the FHA.  Although the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Gallagher seems to hamstring cities, disparate impact is important to 
fair housing and should be recognized by the Court for a number 
of legal and policy reasons.  Eliminating disparate impact entirely 
would be one solution to the problem of inconsistent application.  
But it would be a drastic move with thin legal support and would be 
ignorant of numerous valid policy considerations.   
A. Legal Support for Disparate Impact under the FHA 
1. Similar Statutory Language between FHA and Title VII 
 There is no express mention in the statutory language of the 
FHA that allows any discriminatory “impact” or “effect” to show a 
violation.172  One may argue that, in the forty-year history of the 
FHA, Congress could have included a disparate impact standard in 
the language of the statute if it ever really intended or desired. 
 However, Title VII similarly lacked such statutory 
language,173 but the Court in Griggs still found a disparate impact 
standard.174  It is only logical that when statutes share similar 
language and purposes, and were enacted in close proximity to 
each other, “‘it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended 
that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.’”175  Both the 
FHA and Title VII were enacted for the broad purpose of reducing 
discrimination and were enacted only four years apart.176  Further, 








 172. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 9. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
 175. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson, 
544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005)). 
 176. Title VII was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII, 
or the FHA, was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 
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Title VII  
Employment 
Discrimination 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 
Title VIII  
Fair Housing Act 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–
(b) 
It shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for 
an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against 
any individual with 
respect to his 
compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because 
of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees or 
applicants for 
employment in any way 
which would deprive or 




otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, 
because of such 
individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national 
origin. 
[I]t shall be unlawful— 
(a) To refuse to sell or 
rent after the making 
of a bona fide offer, or 
to refuse to negotiate 
for the sale or rental of, 
or otherwise make 
unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial 
status, or national 
origin. 
(b) To discriminate 
against any person in 
the terms, conditions, 
or privileges of sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or 
in the provision of 
services or facilities in 
connection therewith, 
because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial 




 Given the similarities in language, purpose, and time of 
enactment, the Court allowing disparate impact for one statute but 
not for the other would be at odds with the judicial principle of 
consistency.  Allowing disparate impact for employment 
discrimination cases, but not for housing discrimination cases, 
would be tantamount to the Court making a policy determination 
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that the rights of protected classes are more important in 
employment contexts than in housing contexts.  Gallagher could 
have been the Griggs for housing discrimination law and the Court 
should therefore have held similarly given the similarities between 
the two statutes. 
2. Disparate Impact Is Not Inconsistent with the FHA 
The Court could have found in Gallagher, as it suggested in 
Smith, that the employment discrimination statutory language 
differs from housing discrimination statutory language so that 
disparate impact is allowed in employment cases, but perhaps not 
in housing cases.177  The principal difference is that the word 
“affect” is present in employment discrimination statutory 
language, but no similar word is present in housing discrimination 
law.178 
However, Robert Schwemm, a professor at the University of 
Kentucky College of Law, argues that the Court’s decision in Smith 
does not support the notion that disparate impact cannot be found 
in the language of the FHA.179  He points out that the Court said 
the reason one section of the ADEA is inconsistent with an impact 
standard is because it focuses on discrimination against a “‘targeted 
individual.’”180  But he argues that the language of the FHA focuses 
on discrimination against “any person,” which “reflects a general 
concern with protecting all people, not just a particular individual,” 
so that an impact standard is not inconsistent with the FHA.181  
Since no conflict exists, an impact standard can be found under the 
FHA. 
3. Congress Acquiesced to Disparate Impact 
One may argue that Congress chose to codify disparate impact 
in employment discrimination law in 1991,182 but, since it has not 
done the same in housing discrimination law, the Court finding 
otherwise would be contrary to the intent of Congress.  Congress 
actually had a chance to codify disparate impact under the FHA 
 
 177. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 178. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006), with 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
 179. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 10. 
 180. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA)). 
 181. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d)). 
 182. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105(a), 106, 107(a), 105 
Stat. 1071, 1074–1076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)). 
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when it passed amendments to the statute in 1988, but it decided 
otherwise.183 
 However, by remaining silent on the issue in 1988, Congress 
acquiesced to judicial interpretations of disparate impact under the 
FHA.184  Prior to passage of the amendment that year, every federal 
circuit court of appeal presented with the issue had determined 
that the FHA included an impact standard.185  Congress acquiesced 
because it is “presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial 
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it 
re-enacts a statute without change . . . .”186  Both the House and 
Senate were aware of these judicial decisions, and the House 
Judiciary Committee even went so far as to embrace an impact 
standard by rejecting an amendment that would have eliminated 
an impact standard and added an intent requirement.187  Thus, 
Congress has shown that it implicitly accepts a disparate impact 
standard; therefore, the Court’s recognition of such a standard 
would not be contrary to Congress’s intent. 
4. Violations of the FHA Purposely Not Limited to Showings of 
“Intent” 
 The legislative history of the FHA demonstrates that 
Congress deliberately did not limit showings of violations to 
“intent.”188  The FHA’s principal sponsor, Senator Walter Mondale, 
spoke twice of the Act combating “effects” of discrimination.189  
Additionally, during congressional debate of the FHA, a floor 
amendment was introduced that would have specifically included 
 
 183. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, §§ 6(a)–
(b)(2), (e), 15, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 3604 (2006)). 
 184. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
 185. Id. at 12. 
 186. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 
4, at 12. 
 187. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 12–13 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 
89–93 (1988)). 
 188. Id. at 10–12. 
 189. Id. at 11.  In explaining that the Supreme Court had prohibited explicitly 
racial zoning laws, Senator Mondale explained that “[l]ocal ordinances with the 
same effect . . . were still being enacted.”  Id. (emphasis added) (citing 114 CONG. 
REC. 2669 (1968)).  When advocating for passage of the FHA, Senator Mondale 
stated that it “seems only fair . . . that Congress should now pass a fair housing act 
to undo the effects” of previous governmental discrimination.  Id. (citing 114 CONG. 
REC. 2669 (1968)) (emphasis added). 
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an intent standard.190  But the amendment was defeated because 
the bill’s supporters believed it would have made “proof of 
discrimination difficult in all but the most blatant cases.”191  Thus, 
Congress purposely chose to allow showings other than “intent” for 
FHA violations. 
5. Every Federal Circuit Supports Disparate Impact 
Despite differing interpretations for application, every circuit 
allows for disparate impact showings.192  Such unanimous consensus 
among the federal circuits is a resounding endorsement that the 
FHA includes a disparate impact standard.  The debate would be 
much different if the circuits were split over whether a disparate 
impact standard existed under the FHA.  But that is not the case.  
All circuits agree a disparate impact standard exists. 
6. Administrative Agencies Support Disparate Impact 
 Administrative agencies have supported an impact standard 
in their implementation of the FHA.193  HUD has embraced an 
impact standard in its administration of the FHA.194  Also, the 
Department of Justice has enforcement powers under the FHA and 
has urged courts to adopt an impact standard.195  It is very telling 
that the agencies that actually administer and enforce the FHA 
agree that it includes a disparate impact standard. 
B. Policy Reasons for Disparate Impact under the FHA 
1. Alternative Results in Discriminatory Housing Practices 
Excluding disparate impact showings under the FHA would 
likely result in required showings of “intent” for FHA violations, 
which would raise the standard of proof.196  It is reasonable to infer 
that if housing discrimination is more difficult to prosecute, then it 
is likely that unintentionally discriminatory practices could grow.  
 
 190. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 11 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 5214 
(1968)). 
 191. Id. at 11. 
 192. Id. at 3, 6–7; see also supra note 80. 
 193. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 13–14. 
 194. See supra notes 86–87; see also SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 13. 
 195. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 13. 
 196. E-mail from Tim Thompson, President, Hous. Pres. Project, to author 
(Sept. 20, 2011) (on file with author). 
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The inevitable result is residential racial segregation, which leads to 
concentrations of poverty, which can lead to social problems, such 
as “[e]ducational and employment disadvantages, housing 
dilapidation, loss of commercial facilities and businesses, crime and 
social disorder, welfare dependency, and unwed parenthood.”197  
Further, residential racial segregation prevents minorities from 
having the mobility to live closer to employment centers, which 
may decrease their chances to gain and sustain jobs, as well as 
increase their travel time and transportation problems.198 
2. FHA Is Enforced Through Private Litigation, So Court 
Accessibility Requirement Should Be Low 
 The FHA is enforced, by design and circumstance, primarily 
through private litigation, as the Supreme Court discussed in 
Trafficante: 
Since HUD has no enforcement powers and since the 
enormity of the task of assuring fair housing makes the 
role of the Attorney General in the matter minimal, the 
main generating force must be private suits in which, the 
Solicitor General says, the complainants act not only on 
their own behalf but also “as private attorneys general in 
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the 
highest priority.” . . . It serves an important role in this 
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in protecting not only 
those against whom a discrimination is directed but also 
those whose complaint is that the manner of managing a 
housing project affects “the very quality of their daily 
lives.”199 
As discussed above, prohibiting a disparate impact standard 
would raise the standard of proof for plaintiffs to get into court.200  
Given that private suits are the primary enforcement mechanism 
for the FHA, the courtroom doors should be more open to 
plaintiffs with FHA claims.  Recognizing a disparate impact 
standard achieves this goal by lowering the standard for showings 
of FHA violations. 
 
 197. Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: 
Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89, 103 (1998). 
 198. Id. at 109. 
 199. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1972) (citations 
omitted). 
 200. See supra Part IV.B.2.  
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3. Recognizing Disparate Impact Under the FHA Is Not Exclusively 
For Congress 
Only Congress has constitutional authorization to make laws.201  
If the Court were to declare that a disparate impact standard is 
included under the FHA, many may accuse the Court of 
overstepping its bounds and “legislating from the bench.”  
However, in our separation of powers system it is the judiciary’s 
role to interpret laws passed by Congress, which may then alter 
provisions of the law if it disagrees with the judiciary’s 
interpretation.202  As discussed above, in the field of employment 
discrimination law, the Court interpreted Title VII to include a 
disparate impact standard and Congress agreed by amending the 
statute to reflect the Court’s decision.203  This shows that the path 
to legislation must go through Congress, but it need not begin with 
it.  So the Court would be justified in interpreting a disparate 
impact standard under the FHA, just as it did in the employment 
discrimination context. 
4. The FHA and Title VII Should Not Have Differing Disparate 
Impact Standards 
 Housing discrimination law should be brought in line with 
employment discrimination law.  It seems fair for the Court to 
remain consistent with its holding in Griggs and allow disparate 
impact showings for housing discrimination, just as it does in 
employment discrimination cases.204  Discriminating between 
housing law and employment law seems paradoxical and the 
federal circuit courts could use some guidance, in light of their 
current disagreement. 
Theoretically, there’s no excuse for one type of discrimination 
law having a higher standard of proof than another.  Just as equal 
employment makes for a healthy economy, fair housing makes for a 
healthy society.  Voluntary residential segregation will always exist, 
but every step should be taken to avoid systematic segregation in 
housing. 
 
 201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 202. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 221 (2011) (“The interpretation of existing 
statutes is a judicial function with which the legislature cannot interfere; however, 
the legislature has the power to alter the provisions of existing law by enacting 
clarifying legislation.”). 
 203. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 204. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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C. Suggested Considerations for the Supreme Court in Recognizing an 
Impact Standard  
1. Defining Injury Showings Could Exclude Plaintiffs with Tenuous 
Standing 
 In general, constitutional standing requirements dictate that 
legitimate plaintiffs must show injury to get into court.205  But in 
Gallagher, the plaintiff owners’ standing was not discussed and 
arguably tenuous because their implied injury was that they 
received a disproportionate share of housing code violations, which 
violated the FHA because they rented to protected classes.206  Are 
the real victims in that situation the owners or the tenants?  
“Injured” owners had to fix code violations and raise rents, while 
“injured” tenants either had to move or manage a tighter budget 
due to rent increases.  Owners should not be allowed to manage 
properties out of compliance anyway, and their “injury” can always 
be mitigated by raising rents.  So perhaps the Gallagher owners 
should not have been considered “injured.” 
 If the Court ever decides to recognize disparate impact 
under the FHA, it should consider defining injury showings.  It 
would not be fair to say that one plaintiff (i.e., an owner) has no 
standing simply because another plaintiff (i.e., a tenant) has a 
more severe injury.  But it would be reasonable to stipulate that 
plaintiffs with standing must, at a minimum, be affected within 
“close proximity” by an alleged discriminatory policy or practice.  
In other words, plaintiffs that are only affected by a remote link to 
an allegedly discriminatory policy or practice will be denied 
standing. 
2. Distinguishing Between Public Safety and Aesthetic Housing Code 
Provisions 
There is a difference between housing codes that promote 
public health and safety and those that ensure a consistent 
aesthetic.  Certainly, housing codes of the former type have a 
higher value to society than those of the latter.  If the Court decides 
 
 205. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 592 (2011). 
 206. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 
2010), reh’g en banc denied reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012). 
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to recognize disparate impact under the FHA, then perhaps 
enforcement of the two types of housing codes should be weighted 
differently in disparate impact claims under the FHA.207  For 
example, disproportionate enforcement of a housing code that 
regulates lawn care is more likely to be indicative of discrimination 
than enforcement of a housing code that regulates stairway 
handrails or carbon monoxide detectors. 
3. Distinguishing Between Positive and Negative Disparate Impacts 
Municipal policies, such as housing codes and zoning 
ordinances, can have both positive disparate impacts and negative 
disparate impacts on certain segments of the population.208  For 
instance, the St. Paul housing code at issue in Gallagher was alleged 
by landlords to have a negative disparate impact on their tenants.  
But the neighbors could argue that the code enforcement had a 
positive disparate impact on them because dangerous and unsightly 
properties were forced to shape up. 
If the Court were to recognize disparate impact under the 
FHA, it could perhaps consider balancing the positive and negative 
disparate impacts of a challenged policy or practice. 
4. Disparate Impact Analysis the Court Should Adopt 
If the Court ever recognizes disparate impact under the FHA, 
it should not reinvent the wheel in determining the appropriate 
model for analysis of disparate impact claims.  Rather, the Court 
should remain consistent with the disparate impact analysis used 
under Title VII for employment discrimination claims. 
The disparate impact analysis in employment discrimination 
law places the initial burden on the plaintiff to show a prima facie 
case of an employment practice causing a disparate impact on a 
protected class.209  Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie 
case, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant to 
justify the challenged business practice as “job related” and 
“consistent with business necessity.”210  If the defendant meets this 
 
 207. Interview with James E. Wilkinson, supra note 170. 
 208. Id. 
 209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006); 3 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & 
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 
6:34 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 
209, § 6:37. 
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burden, the burden is then on the plaintiff to show an acceptable, 
alternative, and non-discriminatory business practice was available 
but not implemented by the defendant.211 
The “burden-shifting analysis”212 employed by the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits should be adopted by the Court because it neatly 
parallels the disparate impact analysis in employment 
discrimination law.  Further, this analysis is similar to the proposed 
disparate impact analysis by HUD,213 which has long studied the 
issue and is an authoritative source whose judgment should 
strongly be considered because it actually administers and enforces 
the FHA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Disparate impact under the FHA is an area of law that has 
resulted in too many inconsistent applications across the country 
for too long.  The Supreme Court, or better yet Congress, has a 
responsibility to provide clarity and Gallagher v. Magner nearly 
allowed the Court to do so.  When the next opportunity arises, 
eliminating disparate impact in order to remove inconsistent 
applications is not the answer.  Yet this is the fear that drove fair-
housing advocates to pressure the City to withdraw its petition.  
 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 
209, § 6:39 (“[T]he Act clarifies that the burden of demonstrating acceptable 
alternative business-practice evidence rests with the plaintiffs, not the 
defendants.”). 
 212. See supra note 84. 
 213. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,921-01 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100).  The proposed rule directs:  
(c) Burdens of proof in discriminatory effects cases.   
(1) A complainant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3610, 
or a plaintiff, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 
3614, has the burden of proving that a challenged practice causes a 
discriminatory effect.   
(2) Once a complainant or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth 
in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the 
burden of proving that the challenged practice has a necessary and 
manifest relationship to one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests of the respondent or defendant.   
(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth 
in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the complainant or plaintiff may still 
prevail upon demonstrating that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests supporting the challenged practice can be served by another 
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”   
Id. at 70,927 (emphasis omitted). 
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They would prefer the current problem of inconsistent application 
over an outright prohibition of disparate impact.214  But the 
numerous legal and policy reasons discussed above suggest that the 
Court would be hard pressed to not recognize a disparate impact 
standard.  Therefore, the Court should remain consistent with 
Griggs.  Just as it interpreted a disparate impact standard under 
Title VII, the Court should do the same in regards to the FHA.  
Similarly, the Court should recognize the “burden-shifting” 
disparate impact analysis for the FHA that mirrors the disparate 
impact analysis used for Title VII claims.  The discrimination in 
discrimination law must end—there is no reason for it. 
 Should the Court ever recognize a disparate impact 
standard, the aforementioned suggestions ought to be considered 
to afford municipalities some leeway in enforcing housing codes 
without enduring excessive litigation.  Fostering safe communities 
is an important function that has been delegated to municipalities 
and they must be afforded some protection in carrying out their 
duties. 
 Whatever the case, disparate impact is an important legal 
theory that has languished schizophrenically for too long in the 
federal circuit courts.  When next given the chance, the Court owes 
it an identity.  When that day comes, hopefully the Court 
remembers its precedent and does the same thing for housing 
discrimination law that it did for employment discrimination law. 
 
 
 214. E-mail from Tim Thompson e-mail, supra note 196; Interview with James 
E. Wilkinson, supra note 170. 
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